



I
AT  290
MESSAGE CENTER



FALL EDITION

SEPTEMBER 2000

Chronicle: The Battle in Belgium for Hill La Roumiere:

During the past several months, maybe you have wondered as I have, what was really going on during those first three chaotic days of combat, the 24th, 25th, and 26th of December 1944...A time when neither we nor the officers leading us knew where we were or what we were doing there. But our battleground was indeed the hill called "La Roumiere". Now, time is running out when the recollections of those involved will remain vivid and accurate. But I think we have been able to capture enough of those memories to provide a *corroborated*, unprejudiced chronicle of events that will correct many of the serious flaws of error and omission present in certain publications describing that battle...Flaws present in books such as "A Blood-Dimmed Tide", "Paratrooper's Odyssey", and "Battling Buzzards". All three criticized the performance of the 75th Division's 2nd and 3rd Battalions, and awarded credit for winning the battle to a minor participant. As writers describing history, they were morally bound to seek *all* of the evidence relating to the event, weigh its credibility, and only then draw judicious conclusions based on the preponderance of that evidence. Instead, they chose to form their judgements using only the biased and frequently, self-serving accounts of just *one* of the many participating units...And then unjustifiably claim the victory for them at the expense of the many who had made far greater sacrifices and in fact, were mainly responsible for winning the victory. We think we have been able to extract the truth through study of *all* the evidence from *all* the available resources...Resources that have included unit histories and corroborated eye witness testimonies compiled in his "PKG" by our associate member, Al Roxburgh (CN-289)...His "PKG" is a work comprising personal remembrances of the La Roumiere action, as well as the histories of *all* the units involved, the surprising number of which are listed on page 7 at the end of this article. The remembrances are those written by 290th soldiers who were there, fought the battle, and haven't forgotten the experience. Thanks to Al's dedication and determination, his PKG has been nationally distributed to more than ten archival repositories and has thereby become the premier reference for the battle for La Roumiere.

If you have lacked direct access to the narrative content of the PKG, the scope of what you could have known about that period would have been limited to the narrow coverage we have sought to give you in past M/C issues...Namely, those of December '91, November '94, and most recently, October '97. Now, having come into the possession of some additional, equally credible information, we think we can describe some of the specific aspects of that action with heightened accuracy. For example, some of the questions we think we can now answer are these: Where were the four platoons of AT company situated between the 24th and 26th of December? What was the 290th's 1st Battalion doing while the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were engaged at La Roumiere? What units of the 75th itself and the units attached to it, were involved at La Roumiere? Were there three or only two organized, coordinated attacks on the hill? What enemy units did they face? Were the troops of the 290th's 2nd and 3rd battalions really rescued by the 517th Parachute Infantry, as inferred in books written by or about the 517th? Was the Commanding Officer of the 517th's 1st Battalion really in command of the 290th's forces on The Hill? Who "won" the battle of La Roumiere? We may now be able to offer credible answers to those questions.

On pages 2 and 3 following, you will find two maps of the Hotton, Ny, Soy, Werpin, and Wy area. The first one on page 2, shows the deployment of the attack forces at 2330 hrs. 24 December 1944, when the first attack to capture the summit of La Roumiere hill was launched. The map on page 3 shows the deployment of the 290th's Companies E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M, the Ammunition & Pioneer Platoon of 2nd Bn's HQ Company, the 517th's Company A, and the 2nd Reconnaissance Platoon of the 629th TD Bn. 's Company B, at about 1500 hours on 25 December 1944, as the second (*and last*) assault on La Roumiere began.

Background: The village of Wy and Hill La Roumiere were important objectives for our side for two big reasons: First, La Roumiere Hill was the highest of all the surrounding high ground, with a crest elevation of 362 meters (530 feet above the LOD). Thus, whoever commanded La Roumiere's high ground

had artillery control over the intersecting valleys of the Ourthe river and the stream, (rau) L'isbelle, and of the roads running through them. Second, as we described in the October 1997 M/C edition, one of General

Maurice Rose's task forces (Rose was the Commanding General of the 3rd Armored Div. to which the 290th had become attached on 24 December as a member of Combat Command R), Task Force Hogan, comprised of 467 men (loosely called "Hogan's 400") had become surrounded by units of the 116th Panzerdivision. Hogan was trapped with only limited supplies inside the town of Marcouray, about 5 to 10 miles southeast of La Roumiere. Rose was determined to have an escape route cleared for them, back through a corridor dominated by La Roumiere and its surrounding villages. All were occupied by Germans of the 560th VGD and 116th PZD. Rose was uncharacteristically willing to sacrifice their equipment but not the men; he wanted to get them back intact and that became his plan: They were ordered to (and did) destroy *all* their equipment, leaving behind anything metallic that could produce noise as they walked stealthily through the enemy's lines to reach ours. That included their helmets, canteens, mess gear, - - even their weapons. Faces blackened, they began their ultimately successful, unarmed walk-out after dark in the evening of the 25th. As an aside, though most were unarmed as ordered, at least one of the "400" escapees, named Sydney Johnson, admits to having violated that order when he managed to save a treasured German P38 pistol by carrying it close to the ground, suspended in a sock so he could "lose" it quickly and quietly if he were to be captured...He wasn't. [Please see the addendum pertaining to anecdotal remarks regarding the TF Hogan episode on pp. 7 and 8.]

Referring to the situation map, page 2, for December 24, AntiTank Company's three gun platoons had set up defensive road blocks arrayed along the Hotton-Soy road to prevent enemy tanks from interfering with the capture of La Roumiere and its surrounding villages. (The gun icons representing the squads do not necessarily represent their intended fields of fire.) Menacing these positions from the south were infiltrating enemy infantry patrols from the 1129th Infantry Regiment, 560th Volksgrenadier Division. AT Company's 4th Platoon provided perimeter guard for the company's CP in Ny, a town that only the previous day had been occupied by troops of the 560th VGD. Rifle companies G and E of 2nd Battalion, supported by Heavy Weapons Company H, were assigned the task of taking and securing the village of Wy to the northeast of La Roumiere. Beginning at 2330 hrs December 24 and led by Company G, they were to seek out and commence a difficult night attack on the elements of the 1129th VG Regiment situated there. Company F was being held in reserve at Ny. And earlier, on December 24th, Company I had been assigned to protect the 3rd Armored Division's Headquarters at Hotton.

Also commencing at 2330 hrs on December 24, rifle companies K and L of the 3rd Battalion were to attack up the northwestern slope of La Roumiere, a featureless pasture, two companies abreast with K to the right of L and both supported by Heavy Weapons Company M. Thus, this important and critical assault on La Roumiere was to be undertaken and carried out, not by a regiment, but by the cold, exhausted, inexperienced men of two Rifle Companies, men who had already been on the move for 18 hours, were lacking food (most only had eaten K rations for over 8 hours except for the few who were lucky enough to have passed through a hot chow line before the arrival of Brig. General Gerald Mickle, the Assistant Division Commander, who summarily ordered it closed), and had no maps of the terrain or *any* opportunity to reconnoiter their objective and assign positions for machine guns and mortar drops. Certainly, there was no time allowed for planning the optimum utilization of attached units such as the 629th TDs and the 87th Chemical Mortar Battalion. Also, already soaking wet, including their boots, from hours-long exposure to a cold rain in open trucks, they suffered the final deprivation of being issued a supply of small arms ammunition inadequate for an attack. [One can only wonder what other factors could have compromised their chances of success...unless they might have been expected to attack weaponless, too...And did recon patrols no longer precede an attack?] The enemy, long since dug in at the crest, had the hill's the slopes "sighted in" so they could fire mortars and machine guns at attackers unseen in the dark. Army intelligence had reported that these defenders consisted of "only a reinforced platoon": Soldiers from the 1129th Volksgrenadiers of the 560th VGD, supported from the rear by elements of the 116th Panzer Division.

Of L Company's three rifle platoons, only its 2nd Platoon actually participated in this midnight attack. Its 1st and 3rd platoons remained behind the Line Of Departure all night. This left only the three platoons of K Company riflemen and one of L Company to charge up The Hill without any cover and in the face of withering defensive machine gun fire. In spite of these handicaps, K Company's platoons prevailed and reached the summit successfully, forcing the enemy off the crest. But then, one by one, they began to run out of ammunition. That was not surprising: The men had each received but 48 rounds for the attack, less than half of a combat load. Though probably not a significant factor during this first attack (because two thirds of the L Company attack force never left the LOD), some of L Company's ammo issue was in obsolete,

largely useless Springfield M1903 5-round clips, possibly of WW1 vintage! Reloading used M1 clips with rounds extracted from M1903 clips or machine gun belts, during battle and a freezing cold, dark night must have been a challenge for those who had to do it. Compounding the problem, the retreating Germans quickly recognized the symptoms of their attackers' ammunition shortage and counter-attacked, forcing a rapid retreat of K Company's survivors back down the hill. L Company's 2nd Platoon had been pinned down by machine gun fire on the slope to K Company's left and never reached their objective. They were also able to retreat to the base of The Hill, halting until morning in the vicinity of the stream, L'isbelle Rau.

Some sources have enthusiastically described a further but equally unsuccessful attack, one alleged to have been mounted *at or near sunrise on the 25th* (which occurred at about 0845 hrs.) by the survivors of the first assault...The difficulties to have been overcome in order to mount such an attack would have been enormous...So difficult as to represent a near impossibility: Necessary, would have been ammunition re-supply, reorganization of stragglers lost in the darkness, arrangement for the now-demonstrated and critical need for artillery preparation, and finally, provision of replacements for the lost company-level leadership (e.g., all but one K company's officers were either wounded or dead and L Company had lost its commanding officer and two platoon leaders).

Though there may have been some subsequent, sporadic sorties by K and L survivors throughout the rest of the long night and into the Christmas morning hours (dawn would have been at about 0845 hrs), no further organized American attack occurred until the late afternoon Christmas day. However, given this indication of American strength and determination, and taking advantage of the ensuing lull, the Germans clearly reinforced their defenders overnight to bring them up to at least company strength.

During the forenoon of the 25th, a highly stressed captain from the 87th Chemical Mortar Bn. proposed (literally, with tears in his eyes) to Colonel Duffner that he be allowed to fire the white phosphorous shells he still had, onto the enemy's positions to reduce the slaughter of 3rd Bn that continued on The Hill's slopes. Duffner refused the offer for whatever reason, saying "My men will get that ground without any help from you". The exchange was reported by Charles E. "Woody" Woodruff (of K Company's Weapons Platoon) and demonstrates the willingness of an attached unit, the 87th, to become directly involved in the action. However, though it had been once refused, the opportunity may have been presented again later in the afternoon and executed as The Hill was being prepared for a final assault.

Ordered to commence prior to 1425 hours on the 25th, was a formidable 3rd AD artillery barrage (probably joined by the 290th's Cannon Company, the 898th FA, and perhaps by the 87th Chemical Mortar Bn.). It was the preparation that had been sadly lacking for the first assault. Both Bob McElroy and Dal Raze witnessed this daylight assault, but from different vantage points. Bob's recollections seem to coincide very well with what the survivors of the action could remember and about which they wrote 50 years later for Al Roxburgh's PKG.

Referring now to the map on page 3, during the morning, I Company was withdrawn from Hotton, and joined by a Reconnaissance Platoon of the 629th TD M-10 tank destroyers, crossed the Ourthe river using what remained of a partly destroyed, but patched up foot bridge at Hampteau, to capture and occupy the town of Werpin. From there, they formed up to attack La Roumiere from the west, to complete its envelopment while reorganized survivors of K and L companies resumed their attack from the northwest. At the same time, and as part of the organized attack on The Hill during the afternoon of the 25th, Company F of the 290th RCT attacked from the east, joined by Company A+ of the 517-1 PCT. The combined assault was to "jump off" at 1440 hours but probably didn't gather momentum until after 1500 hours. Though accounts differ as to its duration, most agree that The Hill was secured by 2300 hours.

"...It was now getting dusky dark and we thought we were getting a counterattack by the Germans. But it was the Colonel and 517th Parachute Troops and Co. F firing at each other before we recognized each other as Americans. They were coming up from the left side of the hill. The Colonel, being the ranking officer, took charge and told all of the men to close in around the big tree. I do not remember the number, maybe 50 or 75. He had the artillery forward observer calling artillery fire 50 to 100 yards on all 4 sides. Some of the shells fell pretty close to us around the tree. Then the Colonel said line up in single file and hold on to the cartridge belt of the man in front of you. He then called the BAR man in front with him and ordered all of us to be quiet and led us over the top of the hill to the edge of the cleared field. This was 9:00 or 10 at night. There was a squad of Germans. The Colonel challenged them in German and they did not respond. He had the Bar man open fire on them and they ran off the hill like the horse drawn artillery was behind them"....[S/Sgt , Weapons Plt, F-290] McConley Byrd, Boissevain, Virginia - April 1994.

Most enlightening is the following excerpt quoted from "Pass in Review", Vol 1 No. 14 published by the men of the 2nd Bn 290th on 29 May 1945. It is particularly credible, because it was drafted within the same time frame as the attack itself, and thereby assumes credibility exceeding that of other accounts written many years after the fact and which may conflict with it:

"In the early morning hours of December 25, F Company was put into Regt'l Reserve. However, before daylight it was learned that the 3rd Bn was in trouble and had been driven off a hill which they had taken that morning. Co. F was committed with the 3rd Bn.

"In a frontal assault across an open field swept by machine gun fire, F Co. attacked and took hill 87 [La Roumiere] despite the enemy's dug-in defenses, thereby earning the commendation of the CO of a Paratroop unit [the 517th's Company A] which arrived *shortly after* the objective had been attained." Information in brackets [] and italicized emphasis added/inserted by the M/C Editor.

So what was the role of the 517-1 on the 25th? Their Company A fought alongside 2nd Battalion's Company F, up the steep northeastern slope. Following is a description we were able to prompt from Bill Brannan after the 517-1's April 6, 2000 reunion at Palm Springs, CA. Brannan was a member of the 517th, a scout for their Company A's 1st Platoon, 2nd squad and as such, along with his comrade Don Vaughn, served as his company's point to lead their squad up The Hill. His email, abridged, but quoted essentially as forwarded to me [RC] to describe the event as he had experienced it, is quoted below:

"...I saw bodies of the 290th infantrymen lying at the approach to Hill La Roumiere, somewhere toward late morning or early afternoon, December 25, 1944. Why they were cut down is beyond my scope of knowledge. I would suggest that survivors of the attack know the truth. I highly doubt that the entire regiment was wiped out.

"We had been advised that the 290th would move through our lines and attack Hill La Roumiere. If they were successful, we would enjoy a Christmas dinner and a few days rest. We heard only German machine gun fire which told us there would be no dinner. The sequence of events was as follows:

1. We were told to be ready to move out, and that my company (A) would be the point.
2. We moved into a ditch at the base of the hill where we received intense fire from the Germans at the top of the hill. We also suffered casualties.
3. Lt. Cook, our platoon leader, briefed us with the following instructions:
 - a. The 2nd squad of our platoon, under Sgt. Critchlow, would attack straight up the hill. Don Vaughn and I would lead the attack.
 - b. The 1st squad would make an attack up the left flank of the hill.

"Unbeknown to us, the Germans had evacuated their position when they saw us moving up the hill in the front and on the flank. There were nothing but spent cartridges and debris where they had been. It was our lucky day. There is no question that we would have suffered heavy casualties if the Germans had held their position. My best guess is that our attack spelled their doom, so they ran. If that pillbox had been occupied by SS or paratroopers, I highly doubt that they would have abandoned the hill.

"As for the 290th, I take great exception with anyone who would make negative comments about their attack. The fact that they had the guts to move across the open field against the commanding position of the Germans on the hill tells me that they had great courage. It is my understanding that men of the 290th acquitted themselves with honor and courage in subsequent action....

"The reason why I'm sure of [the date] December 25th is that Sgt. Critchlow was killed the following day, December 26th, in a patch of trees about a half mile past Hill La Roumiere. That is a day none of us in the 2nd squad will ever forget. I hope this helps. Sincerely, Bill Brannan"

There was general agreement that casualties experienced during the Christmas afternoon action had been lighter than those for the night attack of the 24th. Complicating the count, however, is the fact that official figures lump together those for *all three* of the 290th's battalions engaged during the 24th, 25th, and 26th. (During the same time period, the 290th's 1st Bn. had been loaned to Ridgeway's XVIII Corps. It fought in a different sector south of Manhay in a costly but unacknowledged attempt to extricate Task Force Brewster from a German trap.) Together with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions' losses at La Roumiere, the regiment's casualties amounted to 256 men and officers during those three days. Of these, Company C lost 28 in the costly action defending TF Brewster south of Manhay. Company K lost 40, and L Company 14, the casualty ratio of 3:1, demonstrating K Company's cost for the disorganized Christmas Eve attack.

Total German casualties for this period are not known with any certainty. But based on Belgian Florent Lambert's body count, one that he personally performed at the edge of the Forest de la Roumiere after the action, it was 155 or more. And as late as May 10, 1945, upwards of 800 isolated German corpses

were still being found in the surrounding forests and villages, (though not all necessarily associated with the December 24-26 battle).

One biased "chronicle" of the period (written about, by, and for the 517-1), points out that during the night [of 25 December] Colonel Robert L. Howze, the CO of Combat Command R, apparently dissatisfied with the way the 290th was performing under Col. Duffner, "placed LTC Boyle in command of all the troops on the objective, including the two battalions of the 290th Infantry". Rendering this order moot were two facts: First of all, by nightfall (certainly before midnight of the 25th) *the hill had already been secured – the battle was over*. Secondly, no one will dispute that whenever a LTC from other than the 290th would have become present on The Hill, he, figuratively speaking, could have exerted command by virtue of Article 119 of the Articles of War. During the afternoon of the 25th, Boyle was indeed on The Hill with a part of his Company A and had been joined by perhaps three platoons of the 290th's Company F and was leading them up the northeasterly slope. Inasmuch as neither Col. Duffner nor his battalion commanders Harris and Gleszer were on The Hill itself, Boyle would have outranked any and all of the other 290th officers who were present. Thus, at the very least, Howze's appointment of Boyle would have been unnecessary even if it had been made *during the attack* (which it wasn't). But the fact remains that *not one* of the surviving 290th officers knew Boyle was there nor can any of them recall having received *any* direction from him during the battle or receiving the defense tutorial said to have been given to all 290th Company Commanders afterwards...A tutorial aimed at teaching the inexperienced 290th how it could hold The Hill against a counter attack (which never came), expected during and after the night of the 26th-27th. All elements of the 517-1 had departed from the hill for Soy by 1600 hours on the 26th.

The success of the final assault has been attributed to various factors, not the least of which was the very extensive artillery preparation for it, and the eventual provision of an adequate supply of ammunition and manpower. Doubtless a key factor in the success of the second and final assault that came *late* on Christmas day, was the morning respite or lull in the fighting that allowed for reinforcement of the assault teams by the addition of 290th Companies F and I, a platoon of the 629th TD, and the 517-1 PCT's Company A+.

Conclusion: This chronicle has been written to document for historical purposes, the sacrifices made during the period 24-26 December 1944 by the men of the units named below. Together, they drove the German enemy from the village of Wy, Belgium and from the heights of La Roumiere Hill, both located south of the Belgian villages of Soy and Hotton; their purpose having been to secure an area through which the 400+ entrapped officers and men of Task Force Hogan could walk under cover of night to the safety of the 75th Division's front lines. The capture of Wy and La Roumiere was not just the accomplishment of one unit, though the majority of the resulting casualties were those suffered by the 290th Infantry Regiment. Allied forces known to have had primary or supporting roles in the battle were:

- The 290th Infantry's Regimental AntiTank and Cannon Companies, probably supported by the batteries of the 898 Field Artillery
- The 290th IR's 2nd Bn: Company E, Company F, Company G, Company H, and HQ Company
- The 290th IR's 3rd Bn: Company I, Company K, Company L, and Company M
- The 517 PCT 1st Bn's Company A+ (reinforced)
- The 629th TD Bn, Company B, 2nd Reconnaissance Platoon
- The field and tank artillery of the 3rd Armored Division
- The 87th Chemical Mortar Battalion
- The 375th Medical Battalion
- The 275th Combat Engineering Battalion

As addendum to the story of the extrication of Col. Hogan's Task Force, there have been several *anecdotal* references published, one by Hogan himself, that the escape was accomplished without the loss of a single man except for one who was "shot in the upper leg by a careless dough boy and [who] had bled to death" as the 400 crossed American lines. And in another account, "except for one man killed by a nervous sentry". The incident described may have been the one witnessed by George Gregory, a member of Company L's 2nd Platoon. He recalls that a BAR man (outfit unknown but not of L's 2nd Platoon) named "Lasser" had leaned his weapon against a tree, about the time the blackened-faced men of TF Hogan appeared, and that it fell or was kicked over and discharged one round as it hit the ground...a round that hit

the 3rd AD man in the leg. Allegedly, that man died of the wound, *possibly* the result of an improperly treated, hemorrhaging femoral artery (this last is pure conjecture, but how else could a leg wound that everyone considered a minor one, cause a man's death...IF it really did?). Enough said.

News about, and Additions to our Roster:

It's been pointed out to us that Bud (this may not be his correct first name) Scheidt, who was a jeep driver for Bill Nichols, was wounded in action when the jeep he was driving rolled over a mine while on a reconnaissance mission during the Colmar campaign. It is feared that he may have sustained severe damage to a shoulder and arm. If anyone knows the correct spelling of his name and the details of his injury, treatment, and present whereabouts, please let the editor know. In the meantime his name has been added to our cumulative roster and also to this issue's WIA list on page 9.

We have also been told by his daughter that Lennie Dale Bell, our Mail Clerk in Europe, died November 2, 1994 at Lebanon, KS. His name has been added to our roster and Taps listing (p. 9). To help us remember him, daughter Gloria Snow (née Bell), says that her dad had red hair, stood 5' 7½", and weighed about 154 pounds (at enlistment). She also says that he had a girlfriend in France and wonders if that might not "ring a 'bell'".

For a second revision of our Taps listing, we've been advised by his daughter-in-law, Claudia Lauland, that John Lauland, a member of the 3rd Platoon's 3rd Squad, died four years ago. He is survived by three sons, Cary J., Eric J., and Byron J., all living in Louisiana, and now, all subscribers to the AT M/C newsletter.

And finally, I'm sorry to report that about mid-April, Rudy Gillen suffered a mild heart attack, fell in his daughter's driveway and re-injured his back. At this writing and as reported by his neighbor, Bill Kirk, he continues to slowly recover. Rob Smith and I decided flowers and a card should be sent to him from all of us to commemorate his 85th birthday on July 18. Bill Kirk took care of the purchase and delivery. Rudy continues to be an eligible bachelor, but one still wanting to "altar" that status with his fiancée, Alva Rue. No other developments to report on that, but Bill is staying in touch.

Rudy Replies:

I've indeed suffered through my second heart attack. It has been more painful than the first one. But I'm in the care of a physician as well as a chiropractor who have said that I have a good chance of recovery. My problem is that I'm getting older and have the attendant difficulties that go with aging; however, I can endure pain as long as it isn't severe.

I would be remiss if I didn't find a way to notify all my buddies that I'm surviving and using the Message Center as it was intended: Communications between buddies. It's always been, and still is my hope that each of you will use it in the same way.

It's a big help having someone nearby from the 75th, Bill Kirk, to help me maintain communications with buddies Rob and Ray Smith at the M/C, and thereby, with you. It means a lot to be able to maintain our contact through this time of recovery...It bolsters me with remembrances, and especially with your remembrance of me on my 85th birthday. I intend to try to get to the 75th's convention this year, or possibly the next one --- Bill Kirk adds: "The good Lord willin' and if the 'crick' don't rise." All depends on my rate of progress. As best I can, I'm following the doctor's instructions, and being positive about it. I must say that I am grateful to be able to look forward, 'cause we must all go on to that bright time in the Kingdom of Our Lord when we will all be together again in His Glorious Peace.

Looking forward to seeing you at the Convention, I remain your buddy --- Rudy Gillen

The M/C Staff: "*RC*" *Ray Smith*, Editor;
 "*RM*" *Rob Smith*, Publisher;
 "*Rudy*" *Gillen*, Publisher Emeritus

AT-290 KIA/WIA AND TAPS

KIA

Francis T. DeVault

4th Plt 2nd Sqd Near Burtonville, Belgium

William P. Hulsey	3rd Plt 2nd Sqd	Near Soy, Belgium aft 25 Dec '44
W.A. Isaacs	1st Plt Sergeant	In Korea
Carl Sieg	1st Plt 1st Sqd	Friendly fire Xmas Ny, Belgium
Lino Silvani	2nd Plt	M Co, 39th Inf Aug '44 Ste Lo, France

WIA (probably did not return to AT-290 before war's end)

Russell Hedberg	Hdq Plt	Recon Sgt	Details unknown
(?) Holtzhauser	unk Plt unk Sqd	Shrapnel, thigh or arm (at Rhine?)	
Fred Marsh	1st Plt 1st Sqd	Easter 1945 - Land mine	
Alexander Moir	1st Plt 1st Sqd	Shrapnel, left arm - evacuated	
Bud(?) Scheidt	3rd Plt jeep driver	Shrapnel in arm - Colmar campaign	
Niklos Uremovich	1st Plt 1st Sqd	Friendly fire, Xmas '44	
Donald Yack	4th Plt 2nd Sqd	Colmar - Feb. '45	

Post-War Deceased

Lennie Dale Bell	Hdq Plt Mail clrk	2 Nov 1994 - Lebanon, KS
Bill(y) B. Black	4th Plt 2nd Sqd	18 Jun 1998 in WV, of an aneurysm
Charles Blake	3rd Plt Ldr	1995 (reported BB Jan 96)
Robert C. Coldwell	3rd Plt	1986
Paul W. Costinett	AT CO, pre-Europe	1987 Los Angeles, CA
Woodrow W. Fisher	AT Exec Officer	1960
Lawrence H. Groover	1st Plt 3rd Sqd	Oct 1984 - Smyrna, GA
William F. Groves	Hdq Plt Supply	1999 - Muncie, IN
Charles Grose	AT Recon Officer	
Russell Hedberg	Hdq Plt Recon Sgt	
John Heiterer	AT Company Clerk	12 Jul 1994
Justice Horton	3rd Plt driver	1995
Frank T. Kysar	4th Plt	1992
John D. Lauand, Jr.	3rd Plt 3rd Sqd	abt 1996 in Louisiana(?)
Joe Lassiter	unknown	1977
Michael Malinak	1st Plt 1st Sqd	
Fred Marsh	1st Plt 1st Sqd	1967
Alexander Moir	1st Plt 1st Sqd	1 Oct 1984-Cleveland, OH
Edward K. Norfleet	1st Plt 3rd Sqd	13 Aug 1989-Venita, OK
Orland H. Parsons	Hdq Plt 1st Sgt	12 Oct 1997-Cincinnati, OH
Lee A. Premazzi	Hdq Plt driver	6 Jan 1997-Portland, OR
Ben G. Premo	4th Plt 1st Sqd	
Dalton D. Raze	1st Plt Ldr	28 Dec 1997-Springfield, VA
William J. Rogers	1st Plt driver	3 June 1999-Springfield, IL - heart
Carol C. Smith	S/Sgt to 2nd Lt	1960
Edward S. Stewart	Hdq Plt Comm Sgt	1991
Willard S. Strawn	4th Plt 2nd Sqd	circa 1988
James B. Vosters	4th Plt Ldr	3 Feb 1997-Miami FL
John P. Webster	Hq Plt Sgt to 2Lt	1970